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In Indonesia, agricultural trade policy is a politically charged subject. The staple food, rice, is a 
net import and this one commodity has been a central focus of Indonesian food policy 
throughout the post-Independence period. Self-sufficiency in rice, meaning the elimination of 
rice imports, has been a cherished goal of agricultural policy for all of this time. It is an emotive 
subject, closely linked in the public imagination to Indonesian nationalism. When asked his 
proudest single achievement, Soeharto, Indonesia’s president for the 32 years from 1966 to 1998, 
cited the (temporary) achievement of self-sufficiency in rice.
1 This dominance of rice will 
become evident in this study, which documents the changing structure of agricultural protection 
in Indonesia and attempts to explain the forces that have driven it.  
Our four central themes can be summarized as follows. First, variations in distortion by 
sector have been driven by the government’s wishes (a) to be self-sufficient in food, (b) to 
stabilize food prices at acceptable levels, and (c) to promote manufacturing. Food processing has 
been an important component of manufacturing and was even more important in the 1970s and 
1980s than it is now. These aims led to taxes on unprocessed exports and subsidies to processing. 
Two import-competing industries have been significantly protected – sugar and rice – and their 
rates of protection have increased in recent years. The rate of protection of the sugar industry is 
particularly high. Growers of rice have also received protection, but until about the year 2000 
this occurred mainly through input subsidies rather than through the product price. This can be 
explained in terms of our hypotheses both as the main element of food self-sufficiency and 
because rice prices affect manufacturing wages through the cost of living. Since 2000 the rice 
industry has become more highly protected, with imports banned. 
The second theme is that during the long period of the Soeharto government, in good 
fiscal times aims (a) to (c) above could be afforded, but in bad times they could not. So good 
                                                 
1 Soeharto’s New Order regime began in March 1966, even though Soekarno nominally remained president for a 
further twelve months. The reported statement was made during Soeharto’s visit to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization headquarters in Rome in 1985, at which time rice imports were temporarily zero.  
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fiscal times meant ‘bad’ trade policies, meaning more protection, and bad fiscal times meant 
‘good’ policies, meaning less protection. 
Third, accumulating evidence from around the world convinced policy makers in 
Indonesia and most other East Asian countries to rely more on markets and less on government 
intervention. This evidence was based on theoretical arguments, statistical studies, and simple 
two-country comparisons such as Thailand/Burma, West Germany/East Germany, 
Austria/Hungary, and South Korea/North Korea. The policy shift was also influenced by the 
collapse of the communist system and the victory of capitalism in the Cold War. This third factor 
may have contributed to the long-term shift towards lower manufacturing protection and 
agricultural export taxation, world-wide, from the mid-1980s. 
Fourth, following the democratic reforms that occurred in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis of the late 1990s, agricultural protectionism has increased somewhat in Indonesia. 
Aggregate measures of protection indicate that these changes, along with reduced protection of 
manufacturing, caused the agricultural sector as a whole to switch from being a net taxed to a 
(slightly) net subsidized sector, relative to manufacturing. But these aggregate measures mask 
the fact that the agricultural protection is concentrated in just two crucial industries – sugar and 
rice. 
The following section describes the changing structure of the Indonesian economy, with 
emphasis on the agricultural sector. The next two sections provide overviews, for the period 
since independence, of government economic policy in general and then of government policies 
towards agriculture in particular. An attempt is then made to provide a political econometric 
explanation for the changing structure and pattern of agricultural distortions over the last three 
decades, estimates of which are provided for individual farm industries and for agriculture as a 
whole. The final section concludes. 
 
 
Economic growth and structural change 
 
 
From 1968 to 2005, Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew in real terms at an average 
annual rate of 6.3 percent. The broad characteristics of this growth are summarized in Table 1.  
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For ease of comparison with other Asian economies, the table distinguishes between the ‘pre-
boom’ period prior to 1987 and the following ‘boom’ decade, which preceded the Asian crisis of 
1997-99. For many Asian countries, the pre-crisis decade of 1987 to 1996 was one of 
extraordinary growth, far more rapid than in preceding decades. Indonesia also grew rapidly 
during this decade but, as the table shows, only marginally faster than during the two decades 
(‘pre-boom’) before it. Indonesia’s economic growth had been sustained over several decades. 
Output contracted during the ‘crisis’ years of 1997 to 1999, and during the subsequent ‘recovery’ 
period growth it has averaged a moderate 4.6 percent (see Appendix Figure A1). 
As is typical of rapidly growing economies, agricultural output grew more slowly than 
GDP, implying a declining share of agriculture in aggregate output (Appendix Figure A2). The 
agricultural sector accounted for 56 percent of GDP in 1965. By 2004 this share had declined to 
15 percent. Over the same period the GDP share of manufacturing and other industry rose from 
13 to 44 percent and the share of services rose from 31 to 41 percent. For more detailed study of 
the changing composition of the agricultural sector it is convenient to use the input-output tables, 
which are available for the years 1971, 1980, 1990 and 2000. As incomes rise, the share of 
spending on starchy staples typically falls, while the share of spending on meat, fruit and 
vegetables typically rises. Indonesian experience fits this common pattern. 
It must be recognized that output growth within agriculture was achieved with rapidly 
diminishing shares of the national supplies of labor and capital. Furthermore, while agriculture 
grew more slowly than other sectors during boom periods, during the crisis its growth rate 
declined less than other sectors. Indonesia’s agricultural sector has played a ‘shock absorber’ 
role, and this was particularly important during the crisis years, when agricultural employment 
absorbed large numbers of people laid off from the urban centers. Although GDP grew much 
more slowly during the ‘recovery’ period from 2000 to 2005 than during the ‘boom’ decade, 
agricultural growth was undiminished.  
Table 2 summarizes the changing composition of value added in agriculture since 1971, 
using data from Indonesia’s input-output tables. Paddy production (unmilled rice as produced at 
the farm level) contracted from 46 to 31 percent of agricultural value added, while the share of 
vegetables and fruit increased from 14 to 22 percent and the share of livestock rose from 0.6 
percent to 5 percent.   
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It is somewhat surprising that the shares of intermediate inputs used in agriculture 
actually contracted (Appendix Table A1). The reason is apparently that fertilizer and pesticide 
usage was subsidized from the late 1960s until the late 1980s under a program called Bimas, 
discussed below. When the subsidies were phased out, fertilizer and pesticide use contracted 
markedly, especially in rice production. Most intermediate goods used in Indonesian agriculture 
are domestically produced (Appendix Table A2). Between 1980 and 2000 the share of imported 
intermediate goods in total intermediate good use increased from only 3.8 to 10.2 percent. 
In 1971, sales of paddy from farmers to intermediate users (rice millers) accounted for 56 
percent of the total value of paddy output, implying that almost half of paddy output was milled 
by households themselves. By 2000 sales to intermediate users accounted for 98 percent of the 
total value of paddy output. Similar trends occurred in maize, rubber, sugarcane, palm oil, coffee 
and tea (Appendix Table A3).  
The international trading position of the major agricultural commodities can be seen in 
Table 3. The most important import-competing agricultural products are rice, sugar, maize and 
soybean. Major export-competing products include coffee, rubber, tobacco, tea, oil palm, copra, 
shrimp and spices. Paddy is neither exported nor imported, but milled rice has historically been 
an important import item for Indonesia. Since 2002 imports have been officially banned, but 
some imports have still occurred. Cassava is mainly non-traded, although there are exports of its 
derivatives, manioc and tapioca. Much of the livestock sector is also non-traded, although 
chickens are exported, while beef and dairy products compete with imports.  
Some sectors have moved over time from one trade category to the other. The most 
important example is sugar, which was the most important export during the colonial era, but has 
become one of the most highly protected import-competing products in the post-independence 
period. Another example is maize, which switched from net export to net import status during 
the 1990s. Vegetables and fruits have become important net imports, as have soybeans (included 








Indonesia obtained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949. The next two decades were 
chaotic. The post-independence government of President Soekarno pursued a nationalistic, quasi-
socialist economic policy that produced hyperinflation and economic stagnation. In 1966 
Soekarno was displaced amid economic chaos by one of his generals, Soeharto, whose regime, 
called the ‘New Order’, lasted until the macroeconomic crisis of 1998. Soeharto pursued more 
market-oriented economic policies than his predecessor. Upon assuming power, Soeharto 
speedily introduced a macroeconomic stabilization program and then began liberalizing 
Indonesia’s trade and investment policies. In 1967 foreign investors were guaranteed the right to 
repatriate both capital and profit and from 1970 onwards the capital account was almost 
completely open. As we shall see below, trade policy under Soeharto’s government was much 
less open. It was characterized by taxation of exports, especially non-food agricultural exports, 
and protection of imports, including some food imports. 
In the wake of the commodity boom of 1972-73 and the oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 
1979-80, trade policy became increasingly inward-looking. These external events tripled the 
ratio of Indonesia’s export prices to its import prices (Appendix Table A3). Between the early 
1970s and the mid-1980s, the government taxed or banned some traditional exports, pursued 
self-sufficiency in rice, and used part of the burgeoning oil revenues to establish import-
substituting manufacturing industries, which it then protected. In the early to mid-1980s several 
traditional export industries were subjected to quantitative trade restrictions. These included a 
ban on log exports, conferring very high rates of effective protection on the plywood 
manufacturing industry, for which raw timber is the principal input. Licensing systems were 
introduced for exports of vegetable oils, several spices, coffee and some grades of rubber. In the 
case of palm oil, domestic refiners were protected by a tax on exports and a requirement that 
growers supply these refiners with part of their output at low, controlled prices. 
From 1982 onwards, the price of petroluem began to decline. By the mid-1980s it had 
fallen from US$28 to $10 per barrel. Many oil-exporting countries, including Nigeria and 
Venezuela, were unable to adjust to these external changes without devastating domestic 
consequences, but Indonesia responded quickly by cutting public spending and devaluing its 
currency, partly to promote non-oil exports. In addition, a value added tax (VAT) was introduced 
between 1983 and 1986. At first, trade policy became increasingly oriented towards import 
substitution, and the system of import licensing was extended. But after this initial protectionist  
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response to lower petroleum export revenues, trade policy was significantly liberalized from 
1985 onwards. 
With the stated goal of promoting non-oil exports, the government introduced a series of 
reforms which reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Following tariff cuts in 1985 the 
government transferred most customs functions from the Indonesian Customs Service to an 
international inspection company, SGS of Switzerland. The role of SGS was phased out by 1995. 
NTBs on imports were progressively relaxed from 1986 onwards, and the system of providing 
exporters with duty-free inputs was extended.  
According to the estimates in Table 4, the effective rate of protection in agriculture 
declined from 24 percent in 1987 to 14 percent in 1994, and that in manufacturing declined much 
further, from 86 percent to 29 percent over the same period. Since there was probably more 
‘water’ in the tariffs in 1987 than in 1995, the true reductions in protection were probably 
somewhat smaller than these numbers indicate, but the decline was still substantial. In addition to 
the lowering of tariff rates, many NTBs were replaced by tariffs. The coverage of ‘restrictive’ 
NTBs declined from 44 percent of total value added in all traded industries in 1986 to 23 percent 
in 1995. This switch from NTBs to tariffs was somewhat more extensive in manufacturing than 
in agriculture, where the coverage of NTBs declined from 67 to 48 percent. In the wake of the 
financial crisis of 1997–98, the government was obliged to allow free imports of both rice and 
sugar as a condition for borrowing from the IMF. However, with the ending of the IMF program, 
imports of rice and sugar have again been restricted by both tariffs and NTBs. 
 
 
Agricultural protection by sector 
 
 
The distinction between import-competing products and export products is not always entirely 
clear cut, but is nevertheless crucial to any discussion of Indonesian agricultural policies. 
Whereas import-competing production has generally been protected by government policies, 
export-competing production has generally been taxed. For centuries, Indonesia’s major staple 
food crops have been net imports. Both the Dutch colonial government and the government of 
Indonesia in the post-independence period generally tried to control the price of rice and other  
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important food crops to balance the competing interests of domestic producers and consumers. 
Except when world prices of food crops have been unusually high, imports have been directly 
restricted, or subject to tariffs, or both. On the rare occasions when world prices have been so 
high that growers would have had an incentive to export food crops such as rice, they have 
usually been prevented from doing so by non-tax measures, including outright export bans.  
In contrast, export crops have been seen by successive governments over the last two 
centuries as a useful source of tax revenue. Under the Cultivation System introduced by the 
Dutch in 1830, production of cash crops for export was stimulated by imposing taxes on villagers 
that could be most easily paid in kind by handing over crops that the Dutch East India Company 
then processed and exported. By far the most important of these exports was sugar; other 
important exports in the nineteenth century were coffee, tea, indigo and cinnamon. Booth (1988 
p. 202) reports that in the late 1830s, 40 percent of the total income of the Dutch government was 
derived from the Cultivation System in its Indonesian colonies.  
During the post-independence period, the Indonesian government’s revenue from export 
crops has been obtained by export taxes that have tended to depress both domestic production 
and exports of the relevant crops. The main reason for raising export revenue in this quite 
different way has presumably been the government’s desire, in the period since independence, to 
promote the development of the manufacturing sector, of which food processing is an important 
part. Rice, sugar and soybean have been protected from import competition by non-tariff 
barriers. These and maize are discussed in the next four subsections. The remainder of import-
competing agriculture has been protected by tariffs and tariff surcharges. It and export 




The most important and most enduring non-tariff barriers have been those on rice and sugar. 
Figure 1(a) shows estimates of domestic wholesale prices and border prices for rice.
2 All the 
price series in Figure 1 are in rupiah per kilogram, divided by the GDP deflator, indexed at 2005 
                                                 
2 The border price of rice in Figure 1(a) has been converted to make it as nearly comparable as possible to the 
wholesale price. The fob price was adjusted to the cif level by adding freight and insurance costs; the resulting cif 
price was then adjusted to the wholesale level by adding margins to allow for the estimated handling, warehousing 
and interest costs.   
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= 1. While there have been enormous nominal increases in rice and sugar prices since the early 
1970s, the charts show that any trends in the real prices of these products have been relatively 
small.  
It is clear from Figure 1(a) that the domestic wholesale price of rice has fluctuated much 
less than the border price and that domestic prices have not differed greatly, on average, from the 
trend level of border prices. Price stabilization was achieved by giving the state logistics agency, 
Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik), a monopoly over international trade in rice and directing it to 
build up buffer stocks to smooth out fluctuations in domestic supply. It is significant that this 
stabilization of domestic prices was achieved while keeping the trend value of domestic prices 
roughly in line with the trend of world prices. Average rates of protection in the output market 
were very low, but input markets were another matter. 
From the 1970s onwards, the Soeharto government used part of its new oil wealth to 
promote self-sufficiency in rice, by subsidising the adoption of high yielding varieties that had 
been made available by the ‘Green Revolution’. These new varieties required greatly increased 
use of irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides, which the government helped to finance. An 
important motivation for this policy was fear of a repetition of the riots precipitated by high food 
prices in 1965. 
Under the Bimas program, introduced with the explicit goal of rice self-sufficiency, 
farmers received agricultural extension services and subsidized credit, seeds, fertilisers and 
pesticides. The government also paid for increasing and upgrading irrigation facilities. The 
resulting increase in the profitability of rice growing, together with some coercion of those 
farmers who were reluctant to extend the area of rice cultivated, led to a 17 percent increase in 
gross
3 harvested area in the decade to 1985. This increase in area, together with a 50 percent 
increase in average yields in the same period, allowed Bulog to reduce domestic rice prices 
relative to the CPI between the late 1970s and 1985 while gradually phasing out imports and then 
halting imports altogether in 1985.  
Lower world oil prices and advice from the World Bank contributed to the reduction in 
agricultural input subsidies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Figure 1(b) shows a fall in the real 
price of urea from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and a subsequent rise in the domestic 
wholesale price of urea relative both to the CPI and to the border price in the late 1980s and early 
                                                 
4 “Gross” indicates that a hectare which is harvested twice in a year is counted as 2 hectares.  
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1990s. Exports of urea require special approval from the Ministry of Trade, under an export 
licencing scheme. The year-to-year determination of the magnitude of these licences is non-
transparent, but the Ministry tends to place priority on ensuring that domestic supplies are stable 
at a price lower than world market prices and this results in the negative nominal rates of 
protection shown in Figure 1(b). 
In the late 1980s, the strict policy of zero imports of rice was replaced by a policy of 
‘borrowing’ rice from Vietnam in times of shortage and repaying the rice loans in times of 
surplus. These ‘loans’ were conducted in bilateral government-to-government deals in which 
Bulog acted for the Indonesian government. In the early 1990s, it gradually became apparent that 
Indonesia was unable to maintain rice self-sufficiency, even on average and over a period of 
years. To satisfy domestic demand at ‘acceptable’ prices, Bulog was forced to undertake 
substantial net imports.  
When the Asian crisis forced Indonesia to borrow from the IMF in 1997, one of the loan 
conditions to which the government agreed was the removal of Bulog’s monopoly on rice 
imports. Until 1999, there was also no import duty on rice but the IMF’s aim of free trade in rice 
proved illusory because the financial crisis briefly converted rice into a potential export and the 
government banned exports to reduce pressure on domestic prices. Figure 1(a) shows that in 
1998 border prices, converted to rupiah at the devalued exchange rate, were far above domestic 
prices. The reason for this was that the massive depreciation of the exchange rate between mid-
1997 and mid-1998 initially outweighed the much more gradual rise in domestic prices. This 
episode clearly demonstrated that the government’s policy has always been to stabilize food 
prices at ‘acceptable’ levels, rather than simply to protect growers.  
The general increase in domestic prices in 1998-99 and the stabilization of the exchange 
rate after mid-1998 removed the incentive to export rice. Bulog’s monopoly on imports was not 
immediately re-imposed, but a 20 percent tariff on rice imports was introduced in 1999. 
Problems with under-invoicing by importers resulted in this tariff being converted to a specific 
tariff at Rp 430/kg. In 2002, Bulog’s monopoly over imports was restored and since 2004 







The Indonesian sugar industry is dominated by the state-owned mills, mainly on Java, that were 
acquired by the nationalization of the formerly Dutch-owned sugar estates in 1957. Investment 
and technical progress in this sector has been extremely sluggish and the industry has languished 
behind protective barriers. The finished product of these antiquated factories, known as 
‘plantation white sugar’, is not exactly comparable to either the refined or the raw sugar traded 
on the world market. Plantation white contains more impurities—mainly molasses—than 
internationally traded raw sugar, but has already undergone some of the bleaching processes that 
separate refined from raw sugar in more technologically advanced sugar industries. Most firms in 
the food and beverage sectors cannot use plantation white sugar because of its relatively high 
level of impurities; their needs are mainly met by imports of raw sugar, although there is a small 
amount of raw sugar produced domestically.  
As in the case of rice, the main motive behind government policy for sugar appears to be 
the desire to stabilize the domestic price at an ‘acceptable’ level. In addition, in the case of sugar, 
the government has tried to protect the sugar factories that it owns. This may explain why, at 
least since 1957, the sugar industry has been more tightly regulated than any other agricultural 
sector, with the government monopolising not only imports but also domestic marketing. 
Government ownership also helps to explain newspaper reports that, in the 1970s, farmers in 
traditional sugar growing areas were regularly forced to grow sugar to supply local factories, 
subject to threats that other crops would be burnt.  
Figure 1(c) compares the border price of raw sugar (after allowing for margins between 
the fob price and domestic wholesale prices) with the domestic wholesale price of plantation 
white sugar. The chart shows that for much of the period since 1970, domestic prices were about 
twice the border price, implying a nominal rate of protection (NRP) of about 100 percent. 
However, in 2006 this gap has been have been greatly narrowed by the abrupt rise of world 
prices.  
Our estimates of the NRP for sugar ignore two factors, the first of which makes our 
estimates tend to understate the true NRP, while the second goes in the opposite direction. The 
first factor is that our estimates make no adjustment for the relatively low polarity (high level of 
impurities) of plantation white sugar. The offsetting factor is the neglect of the cost of bleaching 
to obtain plantation white sugar. Experts on the sugar industry have suggested that the low  
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Until 1996, the government protected soybean growers by giving Bulog a monopoly on imports. 
Since 1996, soybean imports have been unrestricted and the tariff is currently zero. Figure 1(d) 
shows the domestic and border prices in rupiah/kilogram, deflated by the GDP deflator indexed 
at 2005 = 1.00.  
The excess of domestic price of soybeans over the border price was reduced in 1988, 
when a local soybean crushing plant, operated by PT Sarpindo Industri, began to operate. 
However, Bulog prevented domestic prices of beans from falling as rapidly as world prices in the 
period 1988-94 and Sarpindo was protected by a local content scheme that required the domestic 
feedmills to source at least 20 percent of their total usage of soybean meal from local supplies—
which meant Sarpindo, since it was the only local supplier of soybean meal. The high cost of 
feed inhibited the growth of the increasingly powerful poultry industry and in 1996 the local 




From being a substantial net export industry in the 1970s, maize subsequently became a net import 
item. The transition coincided with a movement from negative protection during the export phase 
to a small amount of positive protection since the early 1980s (Figure 1(e)). The tariff on imports 
of processed maize in the form of pellets and flour is currently only 5 percent, but during the 
presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001 to 2004) the then Minister of Trade (Rini Suwandi), 
supported by BULOG, created import licences which restricted imports, raising average nominal 
rates of protection well above 5 percent. The rents created by this measure accrue to members of 
the maize importers’ association.   
 




The growth of protection during the 1970s and early 1980s, followed by the reduction in 
protection in the late 1980s and 1990s, were mainly achieved by changing the rates of import 
tariff surcharges (bea masuk terbahan), rather than the rates of the import tariff (bea masuk).
4 In 
terms of their economic effects, the surcharges were equivalent to tariffs, but, unlike tariffs, the 
rates of the surcharges could be changed by administrative decree, without the need to amend the 
law. The rates of import duty shown in Appendix Table A4 are the combined rates of tariffs plus 
tariff surcharges. A comparison of Apendix Table A5 (tariff changes) with Appendix Table A6 
(changes in tariff surcharges) shows that much of the growth of protection between 1974 and 
1979, and almost all the much larger increases in the period 1979–85, was achieved by raising 
tariff surcharges rather than tariffs. When protection was reduced between 1985 and 1989, about 
half of the reduction was achieved by largely eliminating tariff surcharges, which were negligible 
by 1989, but had been a very important part of total import duties in 1985. By 1994, tariff 
surcharges had been totally abolished and from 1994 onwards, there is no need to distinguish 
between tariffs and total import duties.  
The import duties on food processing have always been higher than those on agriculture: 
in every year, the average rate of import tax on food processing alone (HS chapters 15–24) is 
higher the corresponding average rate on the entire agriculture and food processing products 
category (chapters 1–24). Within the sectors defined here as making up agriculture (HS chapters 
1–14), flowers, particularly orchids, and vegetables—have always been the most highly 
protected.  
Among the more traditionally agricultural sectors, livestock has always received 
relatively high protection from imports, and so have estate crops. However, whereas livestock is 
mainly import-competing (but also in part non-traded), many estate crops are mainly export-
competing. In these cases, of which coffee, tea and spices are important examples, there is a 
great deal of ‘water’ in the tariff—that is, the tariff overstates the extent to which the overall 
system of protection raises their domestic price. In the 1970s, the total rates of import tax on tea, 
coffee, vanilla, cinnamon, nutmeg and ginger were 70 percent and by 1985 this rate had 
                                                 
4 The term ‘tariff surcharge’ is a misnomer in the sense that the base to which the rates of the tariff surcharge applied 
was the tariff, but the border value (cif) of the imports subject to the tariff surcharge. For example, in the case of live 
animals (other than pure bred) in 1985, the tariff was 30 percent and the tariff surcharge was 15 percent, giving a 
total rate of import duty of 45 percent of the border value (cif).  
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increased to 100 percent. However, by 1989, the total import duty rates for all these products had 
been reduced to 30 percent and by the mid-1990s they had fallen to 5 percent.  
The rates of import duty on food crops have generally been relatively low, at least in the 
period preceding 2000. However, these rates understate the extent of protection of food crops for 
two reasons. Producers of food crops have received input subsidies, and food crops have also 
been protected by non-tariff barriers, hence their separate treatment above.  
 
Estate crops: rubber, copra, coffee and tea 
 
Rubber, copra, coffee and tea are all produced by perennial plants and tend to be produced on 
large estates in Indonesia, except that copra is also produced by smallholders. All have been 
export crops and all have been taxed, but at varying rates. Export volumes of all these 
commodities have declined since the 1980s. High rates of export taxation are a significant part of 
the explanation. Figure 2(a) to 2 (d) show the calculations of the nominal rates of protection for 
each of these four commodities, respectively. For rubber, the rate of export tax has been low, but 
the data show high rates of export taxation for copra and tea. For coffee the rate of export 
taxation has declined from very high rates prior to the 1990s. 
 
 
The political economy of protection: Do good times produce bad policies and vice versa? 
 
 
Some key characteristics of Indonesia’s political circumstances provide background to attempts 
to explain the changes in trade policy summarized above. First, among the Indonesian elite, 
confidence was instilled by the economic successes achieved elsewhere in East and Southeast 
Asia from the 1970s onwards. There seemed no fundamental reason why Indonesia should not 
succeed also and this confidence meant that bold strategies could be contemplated. This 
confidence can be contrasted with the timidity and lack of confidence in the international trading 
system that characterized most of South Asia at the same time. Second, Soeharto’s political 
authority within Indonesia was unchallenged until the very end of his regime. Even policies that 
were unpopular, at least initially, could be contrmplated if Soeharto considered them necessary.  
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Observers of economic reform in Indonesia have coined the phrase ‘Good times produce 
bad policy, bad times produce good policy’, where ‘good times’ means favorable external 
conditions and ‘good policies’ means deregulation in general, and lower barriers to international 
trade and investment in particular. This summary does indeed describe much of Indonesia’s 
history of economic reform. The oil price booms of the 1970s were followed by a series of trade 
restricting import-substitution policies aimed at protecting some at least of the traded goods 
industries that were potentially harmed by the ‘Dutch disease’ effects of the petroleum booms 
(that is, the decline in the domestic competitiveness of traded goods industries due to a rise in the 
prices of non-traded goods and services relative to traded goods – see Corden (1984) and Warr 
(1986)). Trade liberalization followed the adverse terms of trade effect of the decline in 
petroleum prices from the early 1980s onwards. But while the ‘Good times - bad policy, bad 
times - good policy’ summary describes the Indonesian experience, it does not provide an 
explanation for it. Why do good times produce bad policy, and why the converse? 
Observers of policy formation under Soeharto reported the contest for Soeharto’s 
attention between the technocrats on the one hand and the nationalists on the other (Hill 2000). 
At different times, either of these groups might have ascendancy, which meant that Soeharto was 
heeding their messages. The technocrats, many of whom were professional economists trained in 
the United States, favored a market-oriented economy, a strong emphasis on macroeconomic 
stability, and a relatively open trade policy. This group dominated the Ministry of Finance and 
the National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and had considerable influence on the Bank of 
Indonesia. The World Bank used its influence directly in support of the technocrats and the 
Bank’s resources and technical expertise also assisted the technocrats to make their case in a 
convincing way.  
The economic nationalists were more diverse. They included in particular the 
‘engineers’, led by the Minister for Research and Technology, Dr B.J. Habibie, a German-trained 
engineer with a strong preference for ‘crash-through’ economic programs based on advanced 
technology. This group promoted large-scale, capital intensive projects in industries such as 
aeronautics, shipbuilding, steel, fertilizers and petrochemicals. To ensure the profitability of 
these projects, high rates of protection were advocated on ‘infant industry’ grounds. In addition 
to Dr Habibie’s own department, this group was influential within the state-owned petroleum 
company, Pertamina. A second group of nationalists were the advocates of self-sufficiency in  
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food in general and rice in particular. This group dominated the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
food logistics agency, Bulog.
5 More general support for import-substitution based policies was 
concentrated in the Ministry of Industry.  
During bad economic times, the technocrats tended to gain Soeharto’s attention. During 
good times, he listened to the nationalists. The central dynamic derived from the role of external 
shocks to the Indonesian economy, operating through petroleum prices. During the Soeharto 
period, petroleum was both a principal source of foreign exchange, through direct oil exports, 
and a major source of government revenue, through the royalties received by the government on 
those exports. Reduced oil prices implied both balance of payments and budgetary stresses. In 
addition, the majority of Indonesia’s foreign debt was public debt. When the price of oil fell, the 
fiscal burden of debt servicing became more painful. This increased the influence of the World 
Bank, whose willingness to extend concessional loans to Indonesia was important directly and 
also as a signal to other potential foreign lenders. At such times the government needed these 
loans to ‘balance’ its budget. The only alternative was inflationary financing, the consequences 
of which had been experienced under Soeharto. Increased influence for the World Bank meant 
increased influence for the technocrats and the policies they advocated. In addition, reduced oil 
prices meant reduced influence for Pertamina by lowering its contribution to government 
revenue. It also meant increased influence for the Ministry of Finance, whose tax reforms, 
designed by technocrats and like-minded foreign advisors, helped make up for lost oil revenues. 
In other countries, a deterioration in the terms of trade might be met by exchange 
controls, import licensing and other import-substitution policies. In Indonesia, a protectionist 
response also occurred briefly in response to the oil price declines of the early 1980s. But it did 
not last long because it did not address the simultaneous fiscal problem. An example of the tax 
reforms which emerged from this dynamic was the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) in 
1986 and the simultaneous reduction in import duties. An import duty (tariff) is equivalent to 
both a tax on consumption and a subsidy on production, set at the same ad valorem rate. The 
tariff raises positive net revenue because, for an import commodity, the volume of consumption 
exceeds that of production. A value-added tax is a tax on consumption alone and it can raise the 
same amount of revenue as a tariff, but at a lower rate of tax, because it does not expend revenue 
on subsidizing production. Similarly, the switch from non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to tariffs 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Warr (1992) and Timmer (1996).  
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generates revenue. NTBs can be thought of as privately levied tariffs, making no contribution to 
government revenue. A final example was the phasing out of the Bimas scheme, designed to help 
rice growers achieve self-sufficiency. The budgetary cost of the fertilizer and pesticide subsidies 
and subsidized lending of Bimas became serious with the fiscal deterioration of the 1980s.  
During times of reduced petroleum prices, such as the early to mid-1980s, illiberal trade 
policies were unaffordable in fiscal terms and this reinforced the argument that trade 
liberalization would promote improved foreign exchange earnings from non-oil exports. The 
technocrats then held sway. In contrast, during the euphoria of the 1970s, induced by high 
petroleum revenues, the import-substitution schemes advocated by the nationalists seemed 
affordable and were politically attractive. At such times, the nationalists captured Soeharto’s 
attention. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 was the worst of times and produced the best of 
economic policies, given that ‘best’ is being used here to mean more closely in conformity with 
the laissez-faire advice of neo-classical economists. The Asian crisis also provides the clearest 
illustration of the causal link between bad times and laissez-faire policies: the reforms that the 
government introduced in the wake of the crisis were explicitly adopted as conditions for 
borrowing from the IMF, when all other sources of external lending had dried up.  
Following Soeharto’s political demise in 1998 and the subsequent move to a much more 
democratic form of government, the president no longer holds absolute authority and policy 
determination is therefore no longer simply a contest between the technocrats and nationalists to 
influence the president. The parliament, a token institution under Soeharto, now has teeth and the 
president cannot ignore its will. Populist economic nationalism has tended to dominate the 
parliament and this has reduced, but not eliminated, the influence of the technocrats. In addition, 
the conspicuous reluctance of the major industrialized countries to reduce protection for their 
own agricultural sectors has weakened the influence of those technocrats who argue against 
Indonesian restrictions on trade. The increased protection of the rice and sugar sectors that 
followed the ending of the IMF program was a direct consequence of these political changes. 
Movement towards rice self-sufficiency and protection of farmers are both politically attractive 
in Indonesia and, in the public imagination, both are strongly associated with the national 
interest. Protection for the rice industry is supported by all major political parties. With  
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democracy, both rice and sugar farmers therefore receive more protection from imports than they 
did under Soeharto. 
 
 
Imputed protection at the farm level 
 
 
The above discussion of protection rates has focused to the effects that policy interventions have 
at the wholesale market level. In this section, we extend the analysis to consider the way 




One of the intentions of agricultural protection policy is to influence prices at the farm level. But 
the goods produced directly by farmers seldom enter international trade themselves. The raw 
commodities produced by farmers are generally non-traded, whereas the commodities which 
enter international trade are the processed or partially processed versions of these raw products. 
Between the non-traded raw product produced by the farmer and the traded processed 
commodity which enters international trade, there may be several steps of transport, storage, 
milling, processing and re-packaging.  
The significance of this point is that border protection policy operates directly on the 
goods which actually enter international trade, either exported or imported, not the raw 
commodities produced by farmers. Protection at the farm level is therefore a derived effect. It 
depends on the extent to which policies applied to trade in processed agricultural goods induce 
changes in their prices which are then transmitted to the prices actually faced by farmers. The 
question thus arises as to what extent price changes at the wholesale level, induced by protection 
policy, affect the prices actually received by farmers for the raw products they sell. 
We construct a simple econometric model to investigate this issue. We use the notational 
convention that upper case Roman letters (like  X ) will denote the values of variables in their 
levels and lower case Roman letters (like x) will denote their natural logarithms. Thus  X x ln = . 












it P  denotes the level of the wholesale price of commodity i at time t, 
*
it P  is the 
corresponding border price, expressed in the domestic currency and adjusted for handling costs 
in getting the commodity from the cif level to the domestic wholesale level, in the case of an 
import, and for the cost of getting it from the wholesale level to the fob level in the case of an 
export. The nominal rate of protection at the wholesale level is given by 
W
it T . In this discussion, 
both the border price and the nominal rate of protection are treated as exogenous variables. The 
border price is determined by world markets and the country concerned is presumed to be a price 
taker. The nominal rate of protection is determined by the government’s protection policy. 
The farm gate price of the raw material is denoted by 
F
it P  and its logarithm, 
F
it p , is 
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where  i a and  i b are coefficients and  it u  is a random error term. The coefficient  i b  is the ‘pass-
through’ or ‘transmission’ elasticity. The estimated values of the coefficients  i a and  i b are 
denoted  i a ˆ and  i b ˆ , respectively. The econometric estimation of these parameters is discussed 
below.  
The estimated coefficients are used as follows. We estimate the logarithm of the farm 
price that would obtain in the absence of any protection as  
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It is important to observe that the value of the protection-inclusive farm level price used 
in these calculations is the level estimated from the econometric model (equation 4) rather than 
the actual price given by the raw data. The reason is that our intention is to use the model to 
estimate the change in the farm gate price caused by protection at the wholesale level. Thus both 
the protection-inclusive and the protection-exclusive prices used in (5) are their predicted values, 
obtained from the model.  
The implied nominal rate of protection at the farm level can be related to the nominal rate 
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ˆ * * ) ( ˆ ˆ = into equation (5), where  i A ˆ  is the anti-log of  i a ˆ , rearranging, and using 
equation (1), we obtain the simple expression 
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Obviously, if  0 =
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The purpose of the econometric analysis is to estimate the parameter  i b ˆ  for each commodity. 
Here the results are summarized, but details of the econometric analysis are available upon 
request. For each commodity we conduct the analysis using time series price data with each 
variable expressed in logarithms and each deflated by the GDP deflator for Indonesia: the farm 
gate price (LFP), the wholesale price (LWP), and the log of the international price, adjusted by 
the nominal exchange rate and transport and handling costs (LIP). The data extended from 1976 
to 2001. The seven commodities for which these data were available were: rice, maize, soybeans, 
sugar, rubber, coffee and tea. 
We first test each of the series (each deflated by the GDP deflator) for the existence of a 
unit root. For rice, the null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected for all three price series 
(recalling that they are real, not nominal, price series, using the GDP deflator) at the 10 percent 
level of significance. The price series are thus considered stationary. For other commodities the 
results are more mixed. For maize, the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected for 
farm level prices (LFP), but was strongly rejected for the other two price series. For soybeans, 
the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected for the wholesale price series (LWP) but 
was rejected at the 10 percent level for the other two series. For sugar, the null hypothesis of a 
unit root could not be rejected for any of the three series, especially the farm level price series 
(LFP). For rubber, coffee and tea the results were similar. The null hypothesis of a unit root 
marginally failed to be rejected for the farm level price series (LFP), but was rejected for the 
other two series.  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (2) were first produced. In most 
cases, autocorrelation was a problem and an AR(1) correction term was included to eliminate it, 
which it did effectively. The OLS estimates assume that LFP is endogenous and LWP is 
exogenous. These assumptions were tested using Hausman’s endogeneity test, although it is 
recognized that the test has low power when the number of data points is small, as in this case. In 
the case of each commodity, the null hypothesis that LWP was (weakly) exogenous to LFP failed 
to be rejected, confirming the validity of the OLS estimates. Reverse Hausman’s tests were also 
conducted and the null hypothesis that LFP was exogenous to LWP was rejected in the cases of 
maize, sugar, rubber, coffee and tea. It marginally failed to be rejected for rice and soybeans. 
These results roughly support the validity of using the OLS framework to estimate the 
transmission elasticity from LWP to LFP, treating LWP as exogenous.   
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Usable estimates were produced for five commodities: rice, soybeans, sugar, rubber and 
tea. The estimated elasticity had the expected positive sign and was significantly different from 
zero, with the estimated equation performing well. Table 5 summarizes the estimates. For maize 
and coffee, the estimated elasticity was not significantly different from zero and the estimated 
equation performed poorly. It is often asserted that middlemen prevent commodity price changes 
at the wholesale level, resulting from protection or from international price movements, from 
being transmitted to farmers. This hypothesis is rejected by the Indonesian data, at least for the 
five commodities mentioned above. The transmission elasticities are not zero. Economists often 
assume that the transmission elasticities are unity. But the estimated values are generally less 
than unity, lying between 0.2 and 0.8. The lower values are obtained in the case of perennial 
crops rubber and tea, which have high processing costs. The other values all exceed 0.5. It is 
likely that the true transmission elasticities change over time, but the limited data available for 
this exercise made it necessary to assume that the true values are constant. 
 
Estimation of protection at farm level 
 
Given the estimated value of the transmission elasticity, equation (6) is used together with the 
estimated nominal rates of protection at the wholesale level, discussed above, to produce 
estimates of imputed NRPs at the farm level. These are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Because 
usable estimated of the transmission elasticity could not be obtained for three commodities – 
maize, coffee and copra – the estimated values for rice, tea and rubber, respectively, were used 
instead, as proxies for the true elasticities for these commodities. Because the transmission 
elasticities lie between zero and unity, the imputed nominal rates of protection at the farm level 
are somewhat lower in absolute value than the nominal rates at the wholesale level, but (because 
of the assumption of constant transmission elasticities) they track the pattern of the wholesale 
level results closely. 
 
 





In this section we calculate aggregate measures of rates of protection using the information 
assembled from the preceding analysis and following, as much as possible, the methodology 
outlined in Anderson et al. (2008). The annual calculations reported fluctuate somewhat from 
year to year, because international and domestic price changes alter the protective effects of all 
instruments of protection except ad valorem tariffs. In addition, the time taken for domestic 
prices to adjust to international price changes means that annual data on price differences 
indicate some variation from one year to the next.  
Calculations of nominal rates of protection at the wholesale and farm levels described in 
the previous section are used to calculate nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) at the farm level, 
taking account of assistance to fertilizer inputs in addition to output price distortions. That is, the 
NRA for a particular commodity is calculated as its NRA on output plus the product of the cost 
share of fertilizer in production of the commodity concerned and the nominal rate of subsidy to 
fertilizer use (which was as high as two-thirds the fertilizer price in the early 1970s but has 
declined over time and in recent years has been only one-fifth). The aggregate nominal rate of 
assistance therefore exceeds the nominal rates on output for each commodity that uses fertilizer 
as an input.   
The calculations of nominal rates of assistance confirm that during the period 2000 to 
2004, import-competing commodities were significantly protected, notably rice and especially 
sugar (Table 6). The rates of protection for these two commodities increased significantly 
compared with the 1990s, whereas the assistance to maize and soybean producers has fallen. Tea 
is still moderately taxed, but export commodities such as rubber, copra and coffee are either only 
lightly taxed or slightly assisted today, having been taxed – sometime significantly – prior to the 
late 1990s. The average NRA for import-competing farm products is always above that for 
export products, and the extent of that anti-trade bias within the agricultural sector has not 
diminshed over time (Figure 3, and row 6 of Table 7). Nor has the dispersion of NRAs of 
covered products, as measured by the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean, 
declined (bottom of Table 6), which means the inefficiency of resource use across industries 
within the sector remains non-trivial. 
Finally, the relative rate of assistance (RRA) to agriculture is a function of the difference 
between the nominal rate of assistance to tradable agriculture and the nominal rate of assistance 
to non-agricultural tradables such as manufactures but also non-farm primary products from  
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fishing, forestry and mining.
6 Our RRA estimates show that agriculture has moved from being 
effectively taxed by between one-quarter and one-third to being a slightly net subsidized sector, 
with that transition occurring shortly after the Asian crisis of 1997-99 (Table 7 and Figure 4). 
Since we have erred on the side of understating rates of manufacturing protection prior to 1987, 
better estimates of manufacturing protection during this period would show larger negative RRA 




Conclusions and prospects for future reform 
 
 
Having taxed agriculture relative to the non-farm sectors throughout the post-independence 
period, since around 2000 Indonesia’s trade policies are no longer taxing agriculture, on average. 
This change occurred following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. The switch took the form of: 
(a) increases in protection of the import-competing commodities sugar and rice; (b) declines in 
taxation of agricultural exports, especially rubber and copra; and (c) declines in manufacturing 
protection. The movement to a more democratic form of government has weakened the influence 
of Indonesia’s ‘technocrats’, who have generally favored liberalized trade policies. Greater 
protection of some key agricultural commodities has been a consequence. 
Protection of agriculture primarily takes the form of protection for the import-competing 
sugar and rice sectors. Other output sectors receive virtually no direct protection. Subsidies to 
fertilizer and other inputs have been an indirect source of protection to agriculture in the past, but 
these rates of subsidy have declined.  
                                                 
6 The NRA for non-agricultural tradables is estimated using predominantly the effective rates of protection for 
manufacturing estimated by Fane and Condon (1996), who estimate the effective rate of protection for 
manufacturing for 1987 and 1995 at 48 and 20 percent, respectively. They also project the corresponding effective 
rate for 2003, at 13 percent, based on the May 1995 tariff reduction package, which was to be implemented by 2003, 
and which was in fact largely implemented. For all years before 1987 we have used the 1987 values, even though 
some tariff reduction had occurred during the few years before 1987. For the years between 1987 and 1995 and 
between 1995 and 2003, we have interpolated linearly. For 2004 we have used the 2003 value. As noted above, the 




The political explanations for protection of the sugar and rice industries are quite 
different. Protection of the sugar industry is a consequence of the political power of the highly 
concentrated sugar refining industry, including the state-owned component of this industry, 
closely linked with large-scale sugar plantations. By contrast, Indonesia’s farm-level production 
of rice (paddy) is dominated by small scale farm-level producers. The rice milling sector is much 
more concentrated and better organized, however, and this is relevant because imports compete 
with milled rice rather than the raw, unmilled product (paddy) produced by the farmer. The 
political power of rice millers has been an important source of support for protection of the rice 
industry. The enhanced political power of the Indonesian parliament since the upheavals induced 
by the Asian crisis, together with the economic nationalism that dominates the membership of 
the parliament, have strengthened the support for protection of the rice industry. Since 2004 
imports of rice have officially been banned. In part, this policy has reflected the mistaken claim, 
advanced by supporters of rice industry protection, that restricting rice imports reduces poverty. 
A general equilibrium analysis presented in Warr (2005) shows that the policy is more likely to 
have increased poverty, within both rural and urban areas, because the poverty-increasing effects 
of increasing the consumer price of rice far exceed the poverty-reducing effects of increasing the 
producer price.  
Given the politics at work, trade liberalization in Indonesia’s sugar and rice industries 
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, increasing protectionism seems a more 
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Figure 1: Border and domestic prices of import-competing farm products, relative to the GDP 
deflator, Indonesia, 1975 to 2005 
(Rp/kg, 2005=1 and percent) 










































































Figure 1 (continued): Border and domestic prices of import-competing farm products, relative to 
the GDP deflator, Indonesia, 1975 to 2005 
(Rp/kg, 2005=1 and percent) 































































Figure 1 (continued): Border and domestic prices of import-competing farm products, relative to 
the GDP deflator, Indonesia, 1975 to 2005 
















































































Figure 1 (continued): Border and domestic prices of import-competing farm products, relative to 
the GDP deflator, Indonesia, 1975 to 2005 













































































Figure 1 (continued): Border and domestic prices of import-competing farm products, relative to 
the GDP deflator, Indonesia, 1975 to 2005 













































































Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 2: Border and domestic prices of export crops relative to the GDP deflator, Indonesia, 
1967 to 2005  
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Figure 2 (continued): Border and domestic prices of export crops relative to the GDP deflator, 
Indonesia, 1967 to 2005  















































































Figure 2 (continued): Border and domestic prices of export crops relative to the GDP deflator, 
Indonesia, 1967 to 2005  
















































































Figure 2 (continued): Border and domestic prices of export crops relative to the GDP deflator, 
Indonesia, 1967 to 2005  


















































































Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered 






















Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to all non-agricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance






















t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 




Table 1: Real growth of GDP and its sectoral components, Indonesia, 1968 to 2005 
(percent per annum) 
  Pre-boom  Boom   Crisis  Recovery 
Whole 
period 
  1968-1986  1987-1996  1997-1999  2000-2005  1968-2005 
Total GDP  7.4 7.7  -2.5  4.6  6.3 
Agriculture  4.4  3.4 0.6 3.5 3.7 
Industry, including mining  10.6 9.8  -2.3  4.2 8.5 
Services 7.8  7.9  -4.0  5.7  6.6 
 




Table 2: Industry shares of agricultural value added, Indonesia, 1972 to 2000  
(percent) 
Sector 1971 1980 1990 2000
Paddy 46.1 38.0 37.5 30.8
Maize 3.1 3.7 4.1 5.9
Root crops  7.2 6.8 7.6 8.9
Vegetables and fruits  14.1 14.5 21.7 21.8
Other food crops  3.3 4.4 6.4 3.9
Rubber 5.5 5.2 2.0 5.5
Sugarcane 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.5
Coconut 5.2 4.3 3.3 3.7
Palm oil  2.9 2.1 2.4 2.3
Tobacco 2.5 1.7 0.7 0.3
Coffee 2.6 4.3 1.5 0.9
Tea 1.4 1.9 0.5 0.3
Cloves 1.4 3.0 1.6 0.9
Other agriculture  1.8 1.7 3.5 7.3
Livestock 0.6 6.0 5.0 4.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
 




Table 3: Sales to export users as a share of total sales and imports as a share of total usage, 
Indonesia, 1971 to 2000  
(percent) 
 
 Export  shares  Import shares 
Sector 1971  1980 1990 2000 1971 1980 1990 2000 
Paddy
a 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maize 11.4  0.3 1.8 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.2 11.3 
Root crops  4.7  3.7 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Vegetables and fruits  0.1  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.9 4.9 
Other food crops  4.3  0.3 1.9 0.4 0.0 22.7 18.1 47.7 
Rubber 57.5  58.4 6.5 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Sugarcane 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coconut 6.6  1.2 0.3 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Palm oil  2.3  33.5 29.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Tobacco 7.4  12.3 7.6 0.0 1.6 7.3 15.6 0.0 
Coffee 21.5  58.7 13.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tea 24.5  18.5 32.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 
Cloves 0.0  0.0 0.1 3.0 47.4 12.7 0.0 24.5 
Other agriculture  40.5  15.9 26.7 21.2 24.1 43.8 1.4 30.3 
Livestock 1.2  0.0 1.8 2.1 0.0 0.5 0.9 8.4 
Total Agriculture  7.5  9.3 2.8 2.6 1.3 2.8 2.0 8.7 
Milled rice
a 0.0  0.8 0.02 0.01 13.5 12.5 0.2 3.9 
Fertilizer and pesticides  0.0 4.4 14.6 22.9 66.0 18.1 9.6  23.3 
 
 
a The input-output tables classify unmilled rice (paddy) as an output of the agricultural sector and 
milled rice as an output of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1971, 1980, 1990 and 2000) 
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Sectors  1987  1995  2003 
Agriculture  24  12   9 
      
Manufacturing (excluding oil & gas)  86  24  16 
Manufacturing (including oil & gas)  48  20  13 
      
All tradable sectors  18   8  4 
      
Anti-trade bias
b  52  28  20 
 
a Estimates for 1987 and 1995 are from Fane and Condon (1995). They measure ERPs just before 
the reform package of December 1987 and just after the reform package of May 1995. The 
estimates for 2003 apply the same methodology, using the tariff cuts announced in the May 1995 
package to be implemented by 2003. With relatively minor exceptions, the plans announced in 
1995 were in fact implemented. The projections of ERP for agriculture in 2003 shown in this 
table make no allowance for the increased protection of rice and sugar which occurred from 2000 
onwards.  





respectively, the average ERPs in all import-competing and all export-competing sectors. 
 












































a t-statistics are shown in parthentheses. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, using data and methodology discussed in the text. Estimates 





Table 6: Nominal rates of assistance to covered agricultural products including subsidy to fertilizer use, Indonesia, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84  1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
   
Exportables 
a  -3.3 -0.3 -7.0 -16.5 -24.6 -17.2 -3.0
Coffee -7.1 -3.7 -8.6  -2.2 -0.5 2.3 3.0
Tea -6.3 -1.9 1.8  -2.3 -2.5 -13.9 -15.5
Coconut -5.9 2.2 -6.1  -22.0 -45.6 -29.4 -8.1
Rubber 15.2 -3.4 -16.2  -20.5 -31.9 37.0 16.7
Palmoil -14.5 -9.2 22.2  -1.1 11.9 -18.3 -3.8
  
Import-competing products
 a  -2.3 16.5 19.5  5.1 -0.7 -5.8 24.7
Rice 21.9 13.9 7.5  -0.9 -8.7 -13.0 18.7
Maize -15.4 10.2 18.6  21.9 22.5 24.6 10.8
Soybeans -5.9 31.8 49.0  17.0 17.7 17.5 1.2
Sugar  2.1 23.5 53.8  8.5 3.9 11.3 49.4
Poultry
d  72.8 144.3 147.5 86.8 94.9 87.9 99.8
  
Total of covered products 
a  -3.1 11.1 12.2  -0.3 -5.5 -9.1 16.4
Dispersion of covered products 
b  28.7 49.4 53.6  35.0 40.5 49.0 36.3
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  65 68 64  61 64 63 59
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
 
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
c The output-subsidy equivalent of this fertilizer input subsidy is incorporated in the NRA shown for each crop, estimated by 
multiplying it by the share of fertilizer in the cost of production of each product and adding it to the output NRA.  
 
d First and last periods refer to 1971-74 and 2000-03. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Table 7: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Indonesia, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products 
a  -3.1 11.1 12.2 -0.3 -5.5 -9.1 16.4 
Non-covered products   -1.9  5.4  4.2  -3.8  -8.4  -7.7  7.1 
All agricultural products 
a  -2.6  9.3  9.2 -1.7 -6.6 -8.6 12.0 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
b  -2.6  9.3  9.2 -1.7 -6.6 -8.6 12.0 
Trade bias index 
c  0.00 -0.14 -0.21 -0.20 -0.24 -0.12 -0.22 
         
Assistance to just tradables:         
   All agricultural tradables  -3.0  10.4  10.5  -1.9  -7.5  -9.7  13.9 
   All non-agricultural tradables   27.7 27.7 27.7 26.5 17.6 10.6  8.1 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d   -24.1 -13.6 -13.5 -22.5 -21.3 -18.3  5.4 
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided to total value 
of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for 
the import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 
 




t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Figure A1: Annual growth rate of real GDP, Indonesia, 1965 to 2005  
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Source: World Bank (various issues).  
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Appendix Figure A3: Terms of trade
a, Indonesia, 1965 to 2004  













a The terms of trade are here calculated as the ratio of average unit value of exports (value 
relative to volume) to the average unit value of imports. 
 
Source: World Bank (various issues).  
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Appendix Figure A4: Estimation of imputed NRA on output of import-competing crops at the 
farm level, Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 1 (a) and Table 5.  
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Estimation of imputed NRA on output of import-competing 
crops at the farm level, Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 





















































































Actual farm level price
Predicted price - with protection
Predicted price - without protection






Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 1 (b) and Table 5.  
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Estimation of imputed NRA on output of import-competing 
crops at the farm level, Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 1 (c) and Table 5.  
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Estimation of imputed NRA on output of import-competing 
crops at the farm level, Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 1 (d) and Table 5.  
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Appendix Figure A5: Estimation of imputed NRA on output of export crops at the farm level, 
Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 2 (a) and Table 5.  
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Appendix Figure A5 (continued): Estimation of imputed NRA on output of export crops at the 
farm level, Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 2 (b) and Table 5.  
 
53
Appendix Figure A5 (continued): Estimation of imputed NRA on output of export crops at the 
farm level, Indonesia, 1970 to 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data used in Figure 2 (c) and Table 5. 
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Appendix Figure A6: Agricultural production value shares by farm product, Indonesia, 1966 to 
2003 
































































Source: Authors' calculations using FAO data.  
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Appendix Table A1: Intermediate inputs as a share of output of agricultural industries, Indonesia, 
1971 to 2000  
(percent) 
Sector 1971 1980 1990 2000 
Paddy 39.8 28.6 11.8 16.4 
Maize 7.4 11.8 14.3 14.8 
Root crops  26.9 14.0 5.1 6.0 
Vegetables and fruits  5.7 5.9 7.3 8.4 
Other food crops  12.9 11.3 14.4 16.0 
Rubber 57.9 50.4 28.1 28.9 
Sugarcane 37.7 35.6 25.3 24.5 
Coconut 4.4 5.2 9.0 17.7 
Palm oil  54.0 43.0 26.7 32.9 
Tobacco 57.2 35.4 42.4 46.7 
Coffee 35.7 26.2 33.0 32.4 
Tea 47.3 11.3 11.5 14.1 
Cloves 4.9 7.0 12.1 14.9 
Other agriculture  8.6 7.2 10.3 23.1 
Livestock 8.3 9.7 25.7 29.5 
Total Agriculture  34.2 23.3 13.3 17.0 
 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1971, 1980, 1990 and 2000).  
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Appendix Table A2: Imported intermediate input as a share of total intermediate input use in 
agriculture
a, Indonesia, 1980 to 2000 
(percent) 
Sector 1980 1990 2000
Paddy 2.4 3.3 10.1
Maize 9.6 3.4 8.9
Root crops  2.1 4.0 5.1
Vegetables and fruits  8.4 8.2 6.4
Other food crops  3.9 4.4 17.2
Rubber 3.7 33.5 14.6
Sugarcane 42.1 5.2 9.3
Coconut 3.8 11.0 12.6
Palm oil  5.8 1.2 12.1
Tobacco 10.6 0.5 23.2
Coffee 1.5 0.7 11.4
Tea 8.3 0.8 17.7
Cloves 8.1 9.1 22.8
Other agriculture  8.8 0.9 8.3
Livestock 7.6 5.7 5.7
Total Agriculture  3.8 5.7 10.2
 
a Data for 1971 are not available because the input-output tables did not distinguish between 
imported and domestically sourced intermediate inputs until 1980.  
 
 






Appendix Table A3: Sales to intermediate users as a share of total sales, Indonesia, 1971 to 2000 
(percent) 
Sector 1971 1980 1990 2000
Paddy
 a 56.3 70.9 99.9 97.5
Maize 12.2 14.1 35.1 52.7
Root crops  24.8 17.2 11.1 20.3
Vegetables and fruits  10.1 6.9 7.8 11.3
Other food crops  56.6 58.0 43.6 67.8
Rubber 42.5 38.2 92.5 99.3
Sugarcane 75.5 74.5 98.7 98.1
Coconut 68.1 52.2 35.5 55.6
Palm oil  46.6 26.1 70.3 99.7
Tobacco 53.1 78.6 87.9 87.5
Coffee 46.3 19.7 54.1 93.4
Tea 33.3 22.5 58.7 86.6
Cloves 99.8 95.6 96.7 93.5
Other agriculture  50.9 66.2 31.9 73.0
Livestock 79.2 88.9 90.2 82.0
Total Agriculture
b 49.0 52.1 61.0 66.1
Milled rice
c 3.6 6.8 7.8 11.4
 
a The input-output tables classify unmilled rice (paddy) as an output of the agricultural sector and 
milled rice as an output of the manufacturing sector. 
b Milled rice excluded.  
c Data for 1980 refer to milled cereal. 
 




Appendix Table A4: Total taxes on imports, Indonesia, 1974 to 2006 
(percent) 
(a) 1974 to 1994 
  
1974 1979 1985 1989 1994 
01  Live  animals  40 30 45 15 15 
02  Meat  and  poultry  40 70 70 30 30 
03  Fish    40 40 70 30 30 
04  Milk  and  eggs  32 49 73 28 28 
05  Offal  20 20 30 10 10 
06  Flowers  30 60 60 30 30 
07  Vegetables  60 60 86 28 24 
08  Nuts  and  fruits  60 60 90 30 24 
9  Coffee, tea, spices  70  73  94  24  24 
10  Milled rice, other un-milled cereals  5  6  6  4  4 
11  Other products of milling  0  30  45  13  11 
12  Oil seeds and misc. grains  10  25  33  18  10 
13  Gums,  saps  etc.  0  30 40 10 10 
14  Wood  0  20 30 10 10 
15  Edible fats and oils  2  39  59  21  16 
16  Processed  meat  72 130  130 60  33 
17  Sugar  54 69 75 14 14 
18    Cocoa  60 75 70 50 18 
19  Prepared  cereals  44 60 70 36 23 
20  Prepared  vegetables,  fruit  50 60 80 33 28 
21  Miscellaneous  edible  products  40 55 66 26 29 
22  Beverages  73 77 81 50 37 
23  Residues of food processing  30  30  35  11  9 
24  Tobacco  45 50 83 38 23 
  Average,  Chapters  1–24  37 51 66 26 20  
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Appendix Table A4 (cont.): Total taxes on imports, Indonesia, 1974 to 2006 
(percent) 
 (b) 1995 to 2000 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
01  Live  animals  6 6 4 3 3 3 
02 Meat  and  poultry  23  19  19  5  5  5 
03 Fish    20  17  14  5  5  5 
04 Milk  and  eggs  21  17  17  5  5  5 
05  Offal  5 5 5 4 4 4 
06  Flowers  16 15 12 11 11 11 
07 Vegetables  18  18  15  5  5  5 
08 Nuts  and  fruits  16  16  15  5  5  5 
09  Coffee, tea, spices  21  21  17  5  5  5 
10  Milled rice, other un-milled cereals  2  2  2  2  6  7 
11  Other products of milling  5  5  5  4  5  5 
12  Oil seeds and misc. grains  4  5  4  4  4  4 
13  Gums,  saps  etc.  5 5 5 5 5 5 
14  Wood  5 2 2 2 2 2 
15  Edible fats and oils  10  9  7  5  5  5 
16 Processed  meat  25  20  20  5  5  5 
17  Sugar  11  10  8 4 9 9 
18    Cocoa  13  13  9 5 5 5 
19 Prepared  cereals  23  19  19  5  5  5 
20 Prepared  vegetables,  fruit  28  22  22  5  5  5 
21 Miscellaneous  edible  products  20  18  16  7  7  7 
22  Beverages  35 35 35 33 33 33 
23  Residues of food processing  4  4  4  4  1  1 
24  Tobacco  18 16 13 10 10 10 




Appendix Table A4 (cont.): Total taxes on imports, Indonesia, 1974 to 2006 
(percent) 
 (c) 2001 to 2006 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
01  Live  animals  3 3 3 2 2 2 
02  Meat and poultry  5  5  5  5  5  5 
03  Fish    5 5 5 5 5 5 
04  Milk  and  eggs  5 5 5 5 5 5 
05  Offal  4 4 4 4 4 4 
06  Flowers  11 11 11 11 13 12 
07  Vegetables  5 5 5 5 5 5 
08  Nuts  and  fruits  5 5 5 5 6 6 
9  Coffee,  tea,  spices  5 5 5 5 5 5 
10  Milled rice, other un-milled cereals  7  7  7  12  10  11 
11  Other products of milling  5  5  5  5  5  5 
12  Oil seeds and misc. grains  4  4  4  4  4  4 
13  Gums,  saps  etc.  5 5 5 5 5 5 
14  Wood  2 2 2 2 2 2 
15  Edible fats and oils  5  5  5  5  5  5 
16  Processed  meat  5 5 5 5 5 6 
17 Sugar  9  12  12  12  10  8 
18   Cocoa  5  5  5  5  5  12 
19  Prepared  cereals  5 5 5 5 5 6 
20  Prepared  vegetables,  fruit  5 5 5 5 5 6 
21  Miscellaneous  edible  products  7  7  7  10 10 10 
22  Beverages  33 33 33 33 33 34 
23  Residues  of  food  processing  1 1 1 1 1 2 
24  Tobacco  10 10 10 11 11 11 
  Average, HS Chapters 1–24  6  6  6  7  7  7 
Source: Directorate General of Customs and Excise, Import Duties, Indonesia, Jakarta (various 
years).   
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Appendix Table A5: Increases in tariffs (‘bea masuk’), Indonesia, 1974 to 1994 
(percentage points) 
   1974–79 1979–85 1985–89  1989–94
01  Live  animals  -10 0 -15 0 
02 Meat  and  poultry  0  0  -10  0 
03 Fish    0  0  -10  0 
04 Milk  and  eggs  14  0  -18  0 
05 Offal  0  0  -10  0 
06  Flowers  0 0 0 0 
07 Vegetables  0  0  -34  -3 
08 Nuts  and  fruits  0  0  -30  -6 
9  Coffee, tea, spices  0  0  -46  0 
10  Milled rice, other un-milled cereals  2  -1  -1  0 
11  Other products of milling  30  0  -18  -2 
12  Oil seeds and misc. grains  15  0  -14  -1 
13 Gums,  saps  etc.  30  0  -20  0 
14 Wood  20  0  -10  0 
15  Edible fats and oils  37  0  -24  0 
16 Processed  meat  -2  0  -15  -22 
17 Sugar  6  0  -46  0 
18   Cocoa  0  0  -10  -32 
19  Prepared  cereals  6  -6 -13 -9 
20 Prepared  vegetables,  fruit  0  0  -20  -2 
21 Miscellaneous  edible  products  0  0  -14  3 
22 Beverages  -3  0  -14  -7 
23  Residues of food processing  0  0  -21  0 
24 Tobacco  0  0  -23  0 
 Average,  Chapters  1–24  9  0  –21  –4 
 
Source: Directorate General of Customs and Excise, Import Duties, Indonesia, Jakarta (various 
years).   
 
62
Appendix Table A6: Increases in tariff surcharges (‘bea masuk terbahan’), Indonesia, 1974 to 
1994 
(percentage points) 
    1974–79 1979–85 1985–89 1989–94 
01 Live  animals  0  15  -15  0 
02  Meat  and  poultry  30 0 -30 0 
03 Fish    0  30  -30  0 
04 Milk  and  eggs  3  24  -27  0 
05 Offal  0  10  -10  0 
06  Flowers  30 0 -30 0 
07 Vegetables  0  26  -25  -2 
08 Nuts  and  fruits  0  30  -30  0 
9  Coffee, tea, spices  3  21  -24  0 
10  Milled rice, other un-milled cereals  0  0  -1  -1 
11  Other products of milling  0  15  -15  0 
12  Oil seeds and misc. grains  0  8  -2  -7 
13 Gums,  saps  etc.  0  10  -10  0 
14 Wood  0  10  -10  0 
15  Edible fats and oils  0  20  -15  -5 
16 Processed  meat  60  0  -55  -5 
17  Sugar  9  6 -15 0 
18   Cocoa  15  -5  -10  0 
19 Prepared  cereals  10  16  -21  -5 
20 Prepared  vegetables,  fruit  10  20  -27  -3 
21 Miscellaneous  edible  products  15  11  -26  0 
22 Beverages  7  4  -16  -6 
23  Residues of food processing  0  5  -3  -3 
24 Tobacco  5  33  -23  -15 
 Average,  Chapters  1–24  6  15  –19  –2 
Source: Directorate General of Customs and Excise, Import Duties, Indonesia, Jakarta (various 
years).   
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Appendix Table A7: Increases in total import taxes, Indonesia, 1994 to 2006 
(percentage) 
   1994–95 1995–97 1997–98  1998–06  1994–06 
01  Live  animals  -9 -3 -1 -1  -13 
02 Meat  and  poultry  -7  -4  -14  0  -25 
03 Fish    -10  -6  -9  0  -25 
04 Milk  and  eggs  -7  -4  -12  0  -23 
05  Offal  -5 -1 0 0 -6 
06 Flowers  -14  -4  -1  2  -18 
07 Vegetables  -6  -3  -10  0  -19 
08 Nuts  and  fruits  -8  -1  -10  1  -18 
9  Coffee, tea, spices  -3  -4  -12  0  -19 
10  Milled rice, other un-milled cereals  -1  0  0  9  8 
11  Other products of milling  -6  0  0  1  -6 
12  Oil seeds and misc. grains  -6  0  0  0  -6 
13  Gums,  saps  etc.  -5 0 0 0 -5 
14  Wood  -5 -3 0 0 -8 
15  Edible fats and oils  -6  -3  -2  0  -11 
16 Processed  meat  -8  -5  -15  1  -27 
17  Sugar  -3 -3 -4 4 -6 
18    Cocoa  -5 -4 -4 7 -6 
19 Prepared  cereals  1  -5  -14  1  -17 
20 Prepared  vegetables,  fruit  -1  -6  -17  1  -23 
21 Miscellaneous  edible  products  -8  -4  -9  3  -18 
22  Beverages  -2 -1 -2 1 -3 
23  Residues of food processing  -5  0  0  -2  -7 
24 Tobacco  -4  -5  -3  0  -12 
 Average,  Chapters  1–24  -4  -3  -7  1  -13 




Appendix Table A8: Nominal rate of assistance at the wholesale level, by agricultural 
commodity, and fertilizer consumer tax equivalent (CTE), Indonesia, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
Year Rice Sugar Soybean Maize Rubber Copra Coffee Tea 
Fertilizer 
CTE
1970 0.0 0.07 0.3 -41.9 -4.3 -36.1 -54.8 -23.4 -67.9
1971 0.0 106.5 -3.8 -46.7 -9.3 -8.2 -59.7 -17.7 -67.9
1972 0.0 26.9 -8.8 -11.0 -6.1 2.6 -65.8 -21.7 -67.9
1973 0.0 26.0 -45.4 -49.0 -2.2 -6.9 -30.7 -17.0 -67.9
1974 0.0 -56.5 -10.4 -53.0 -10.8 -26.5 -40.9 -32.8 -67.9
1975 -36.7 -22.8 31.9 -8.1 -9.5 -13.7 -39.1 -14.4 -67.9
1976 14.8 49.0 33.1 21.9 -3.6 20.9 -28.4 1.9 -50.5
1977 13.8 127.0 27.5 28.1 -2.3 30.8 -36.7 4.1 -47.0
1978 -14.2 140.4 31.8 23.9 -3.2 19.1 -36.6 84.0 -45.9
1979 -8.7 62.5 21.6 9.3 1.0 -36.9 -43.6 41.7 -48.8
1980 -21.6 -28.9 31.2 8.5 -1.2 -11.8 -45.2 0.2 -48.0
1981 -23.9 91.0 39.9 10.8 -6.0 18.1 -43.0 14.4 -54.6
1982 30.3 243.6 46.0 39.8 3.4 14.8 -41.9 -4.5 -57.5
1983 4.4 150.9 22.2 6.1 -24.3 -40.3 -63.5 -48.9 -60.0
1984 9.5 290.4 20.7 4.9 -17.6 -54.0 -65.7 -59.0 -61.6
1985 17.6 394.8 36.3 21.8 -7.7 -38.3 -57.2 -35.4 -60.3
1986 14.5 192.6 37.9 27.8 -9.9 -5.4 -45.0 -23.0 -53.4
1987 -11.9 122.3 29.1 39.7 3.0 -42.9 -15.2 -47.7 -51.6
1988 -19.4 59.2 11.4 -13.7 3.2 -50.5 -32.2 -39.9 -51.9
1989 -24.6 36.7 17.6 -9.8 2.4 -82.9 -47.0 -50.0 -44.6
1990 -16.0 53.0 31.7 25.1 2.7 -74.8 -36.6 -59.1 -39.4
1991 -21.1 115.6 35.8 31.6 4.8 -77.2 -27.1 -49.1 -40.2
1992 -10.2 121.8 37.9 20.8 4.0 -78.6 -24.3 -52.2 -34.3
1993 -2.4 103.0 32.3 29.7 9.2 -75.6 -16.3 -46.1 -21.7
1994 -7.6 63.3 35.9 33.7 10.0 -80.6 -21.4 -36.9 -19.9
1995 -12.9 55.6 33.4 27.4 12.1 -78.1 -21.6 -40.0 -22.1
1996 -9.8 67.7 21.6 19.0 9.8 -78.7 4.1 -61.1 -22.7
1997 -3.6 41.6 15.1 32.0 4.1 -37.2 -1.1 -66.7 -23.5
1998 -42.9 -4.9 -11.2 -0.9 3.6 -55.1 -29.3 -69.1 -37.0
1999 11.4 58.9 33.6 22.6 24.2 -29.8 -6.7 -54.5 -28.4
2000 14.0 25.7 -1.6 -7.9 6.4 -23.8 7.7 -60.0 -25.6
2001 16.0 39.6 6.6 -19.0 11.5 -23.9 -2.7 -57.8 -22.3
2002 29.1 70.5 6.7 -1.6 -8.2 -25.2 -9.6 -50.3 -19.7
2003 33.4 128.5 5.0 33.9 -14.8 -15.9 -9.5 -41.3 -14.3
2004 8.2 88.4 -4.4 8.8 -22.5 -15.9 -8.4 -49.4 -28.7




Appendix Table A9: Nominal rate of assistance at the farm level, by agricultural commodity, 
excluding fertilizer subsidy, Indonesia, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
Year  Rice Sugar  Soybean  Palmoil Maize Rubber Copra  Coffee  Tea  Poultry
1970 10.6 15.7 -1.9 -33.5 -9.0 -4.2 -17.7 -18.7 -4.9 na
1971 10.6 15.7 -1.9 -30.3 -22.7 -4.2 -3.7 -21.1 -4.9  89.4
1972 10.6 -10.3 -7.7 25.6 -24.6 4.7 1.1 -24.4 -22.3  62.2
1973 10.6 -42.9 -23.9 7.2 -7.4 9.8 -3.1 -9.1 -29.5  50.4
1974 10.6 -22.8 -13.0 -41.5 -25.4 -14.2 -12.6 -12.8 -31.8  89.2
1975 10.6 16.2 22.9 -15.3 -26.8 -2.3 -6.2 -12.1 -18.0  106.8
1976 10.6 52.7 24.9 6.6 -5.6 7.7 8.6 -8.3 -15.7  92.3
1977 14.6 28.2 26.4 -2.7 19.8 -11.2 12.4 -11.2 -13.4  187.4
1978 -7.9 -4.2 32.0 -12.8 27.4 -40.9 7.9 -11.2 13.0  219.6
1979 -0.1 -23.2 37.1 -21.7 22.2 -39.7 -18.2 -13.9 -3.9  115.2
1980 -17.3 15.6 29.4 9.8 7.4 -42.3 -5.3 -14.5 -0.4  137.7
1981 -14.2 47.1 45.9 14.3 6.7 -36.3 7.5 -13.6 13.0  183.1
1982 24.6 18.9 73.1 64.9 8.8 -27.9 6.2 -13.2 5.6  185.6
1983 2.9 55.1 37.2 35.7 45.2 -29.3 -20.2 -23.1 -13.7  132.2
1984 1.8 78.3 39.9 -13.6 4.8 -18.5 -28.7 -24.3 -14.0  99.0
1985 8.1 28.3 26.1 3.8 3.8 -21.9 -19.0 -19.9 -0.6  144.1
1986 1.5 10.3 33.0 48.4 19.8 -37.5 -2.4 -14.4 -0.7  107.8
1987 -9.7 -10.5 9.3 -12.8 27.1 -46.4 -21.7 -4.2 -15.1  57.9
1988 -14.4 -17.4 -4.5 -33.4 44.9 -30.2 -26.4 -9.6 -7.9  68.1
1989 -17.4 -15.2 -1.8 -11.6 -9.0 -23.8 -53.8 -15.2 -6.4  55.8
1990 -13.5 7.6 16.6 17.1 -6.6 -30.7 -45.2 -11.2 -11.1  68.9
1991 -19.6 8.2 14.2 0.4 23.6 -36.0 -47.6 -7.9 -4.9  147.3
1992 -10.5 -2.2 11.1 4.3 32.2 -39.4 -49.0 -7.0 -6.1  69.2
1993 -5.6 -10.0 14.1 23.3 18.7 -40.6 -46.0 -4.5 -7.0  86.2
1994 -7.4 -10.0 17.2 14.1 29.6 -42.2 -51.1 -6.1 4.3  102.9
1995 -14.2 -10.0 26.0 -17.6 35.3 -35.3 -48.4 -6.2 4.3  102.1
1996 -17.2 -15.4 16.8 1.6 26.5 -24.9 -49.1 1.1 -15.1  136.2
1997 -9.1 -32.6 13.4 -12.0 16.8 52.1 -18.4 -0.3 -24.9  70.9
1998 -37.9 61.2 -3.4 -57.1 32.8 51.0 -29.5 -8.6 -26.4 -8.9
1999 0.8 32.6 21.7 -6.2 -0.6 117.9 -14.3 -1.8 -18.6  139.2
2000 12.6 56.1 -1.2 -2.8 20.7 51.3 -11.2 2.0 -21.2  107.5
2001 19.1 22.7 -7.3 12.4 -5.4 34.4 -11.2 -0.7 -20.1  70.4
2002 20.7 38.7 3.5 -11.6 -9.0 -3.7 -11.9 -2.6 -16.6  120.2
2003 23.6 65.9 2.6 -13.2 -22.7 -6.8 -7.3 -2.6 -12.9  101.2
2004 6.0 47.4 -2.4 na -24.6 -10.5 -7.3 -2.3 -16.2  na
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
66
Appendix Table A10: Nominal rate of assistance at the farm level, covered agricultural products 
including fertilizer subsidy,
a Indonesia, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
Year  Rice Sugar Soybean Palm 
oil  Maize Rubber  Copra Coffee Tea  Poultry Weighted
average
1970 22.0 26.1 1.7 -33.5 -7.2 12.0 -16.6 -8.5 9.5  na -5.8
1971 22.0 26.5 1.7 -30.3 -20.5 12.3 -2.4 -10.9 8.5  89.4 5.1
1972 21.9 0.8 -4.0 25.6 -22.2 21.5 2.5 -14.2 -9.9  62.2 1.4
1973 21.9 -31.6 -20.1 7.2 -4.8 27.0 -1.7 1.0 -18.0  50.4 -7.5
1974 21.9 -11.1 -9.1 -41.5 -22.5 3.2 -11.1 -2.7 -21.4  89.2 -8.5
1975 21.8 28.3 26.9 -15.3 -23.6 15.5 -4.7 -2.0 -8.6  106.8 14.7
1976 18.8 61.7 27.8 6.6 -3.1 20.9 9.9 -1.0 -9.6  92.3 20.8
1977 22.1 36.8 29.2 -2.7 22.4 1.3 13.6 -4.4 -8.4  187.4 20.2
1978 -0.6 4.4 34.8 -12.8 30.1 -28.5 9.1 -4.5 17.2  219.6 3.2
1979 7.6 -13.8 40.1 -21.7 25.2 -26.3 -16.8 -6.8 -0.1  115.2 -3.6
1980 -9.7 25.0 32.4 9.8 10.6 -28.9 -3.9 -7.5 2.6  137.7 -3.5
1981 -6.0 57.7 49.5 14.3 10.5 -21.5 9.3 -5.3 16.5  183.1 9.3
1982 32.8 29.9 77.1 64.9 12.9 -12.9 8.2 -3.9 9.3  185.6 27.4
1983 11.0 66.4 41.6 35.7 49.7 -14.1 -17.9 -13.0 -9.7  132.2 16.6
1984 9.6 89.9 44.6 -13.6 9.6 -3.5 -26.2 -13.4 -9.8  99.0 11.0
1985 15.3 39.4 31.0 3.8 8.7 -7.7 -16.3 -8.7 3.6  144.1 14.4
1986 7.4 20.1 37.4 48.4 24.3 -25.4 0.2 -4.2 3.2  107.8 10.8
1987 -4.4 -1.3 13.8 -12.8 31.6 -35.2 -19.1 6.1 -11.3  57.9 -5.2
1988 -9.4 -8.2 0.2 -33.4 49.6 -19.4 -23.6 1.1 -4.0  68.1 -9.2
1989 -13.5 -7.4 2.4 -11.6 -4.8 -14.9 -51.2 -5.6 -3.0  55.8 -12.3
1990 -10.4 14.4 20.5 17.1 -2.8 -23.2 -42.8 -2.4 -8.0  68.9 -4.5
1991 -16.3 15.0 18.1 0.4 27.5 -28.4 -44.9 1.0 -1.7  147.3 -6.8
1992 -7.7 3.5 14.5 4.3 35.5 -33.0 -46.6 0.5 -3.4  69.2 -5.3
1993 -3.8 -6.4 16.3 23.3 20.7 -36.6 -44.4 0.2 -5.2  86.2 -4.7
1994 -5.6 -6.8 19.2 14.1 31.4 -38.5 -49.6 -1.9 5.9  102.9 -6.2
1995 -12.2 -6.5 28.2 -17.6 37.4 -31.3 -46.6 -1.5 6.2  102.1 -10.8
1996 -15.1 -11.8 19.0 1.6 28.6 -20.8 -47.1 5.8 -13.2  136.2 -9.8
1997 -6.9 -29.0 15.7 -12.0 18.9 56.3 -16.2 4.5 -23.0  70.9 -6.8
1998 -34.3 66.8 0.2 -57.1 36.1 57.6 -25.8 -1.2 -23.3  -8.9 -24.2
1999 3.6 36.9 24.4 -6.2 2.0 123.0 -11.4 3.9 -16.1  139.2 6.2
2000 15.2 59.9 1.3 -2.8 23.0 55.7 -8.4 7.0 -19.1  107.5 15.5
2001 21.4 26.0 -5.1 12.4 -3.4 38.3 -8.7 3.6 -18.2  70.4 17.0
2002 22.7 41.5 5.4 -11.6 0.6 -0.3 -9.6 1.2 -14.9  120.2 15.4
2003 25.1 68.0 4.0 -13.2 25.2 -4.3 -5.6 0.1 -11.7  101.2 17.9
2004 9.1 51.4 0.4 na 8.9 -5.7 -3.7 3.1 -13.7 na  12.2
a NRA at the farm level for that industry’s output plus the product of the cost share of fertilizer 
for that industry and the subsidy to fertilizer use (from Appendix Tables A8 and A9); averaged 
using value of production at undistorted prices as weights (Appendix Table A12).  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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agricultural industries, to non-agricultural industries, and relative rate of assistance,
c Indonesia, 
1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
Total ag NRA 
Covered products 














1970 4 -10  -4  -5  -6  28  -26 
1971 4  1  3  4  5  28  -18 
1972 5  -4  1  1  2  28  -20 
1973 4 -11  -4  -6  -7  28  -27 
1974 4 -13  -6  -7  -8  28  -28 
1975 8  7  6  12  13  28  -11 
1976 6  15  12  18  20  28  -6 
1977 5  15  12  17  20  28  -6 
1978 5  -2  2  3  3  28  -19 
1979 6 -10  -4  -4  -4  28  -25 
1980 6 -10  -4  -4  -4  28  -25 
1981 7  2  5  8  9  28  -15 
1982 7  20  13  22  25  28  -2 
1983 7  10  5  12  14  28  -11 
1984 6  5  2  7  9  28  -15 
1985 6  8  4  10  12  28  -12 
1986 6  5  4  8  9  28  -14 
1987 5 -10  -6  -6  -7  28  -27 
1988 5 -14  -9  -9  -10  26  -29 
1989 4 -16  -12  -12  -14  24  -30 
1990 3  -8  -7  -6  -6  22  -23 
1991 4 -11  -10  -8  -9  20  -24 
1992 3  -8  -9  -7  -7  18  -21 
1993 2  -7  -8  -6  -7  16  -19 
1994 2  -8  -8  -7  -8  14  -19 
1995 2 -13  -11  -11  -12  12  -21 
1996 2 -12  -9  -10  -11  11  -20 
1997 2  -9  -4  -6  -7  11  -16 
1998 4 -28  -17  -22  -25  10  -31 
1999 3  3  3  5  6  10  -4 
2000 3  13  8  13  14  9  5 
2001 2  15  9  14  16  9  7 
2002 2  13  7  12  14  8  5 
2003 2  16  9  14  16  8  8 
2004 3  9  3  8  10  8  2 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Appendix Table A12: Value shares of primary production of covered products at farmgate 
undistorted prices, Indonesia, 1970 to 2004  
(percent) 
 





1970  18  11  1  1 4 5 2 1 n.a.  23  66 34
1971  16  15  1  1 4 4 2 1 1  23  68 32
1972  16  18  1  1 4 3 1 1 1  16  62 38
1973  15  17  2  1 3 4 1 0 1  21  65 35
1974  12  13  1  1 3 4 1 0 1  28  65 35
1975  34  11  1  1 4 2 1 0 1  12  69 31
1976  36  8  1  1 3 3 2 0 1  14  70 30
1977  30  8  1  1 2 3 3 1 0  18  67 33
1978  32  11  1  1 2 4 2 0 0  15  68 32
1979  28  11  1  1 2 5 2 0 1  15  67 33
1980  34  7  1  1 2 6 2 0 1  11  65 35
1981  35  11  1  1 2 3 1 0 1  10  65 35
1982  31  14  0  1 2 3 1 0 1  9  63 37
1983  33  10  1  1 2 3 1 0 1  11  63 37
1984  31  7  1  2 3 3 1 0 1  13  62 38
1985  30  10  1  2 3 3 1 0 1  10  60 40
1986  29  11  1  1 3 3 2 0 1  7  59 41
1987  27  11  1  2 2 5 2 0 1  8  60 40
1988  30  12  1  2 1 5 2 0 1  8  63 37
1989  35  12  1  2 2 4 1 0 1  4  64 36
1990  35  11  1  2 4 4 1 0 2  3  63 37
1991  36  11  1  2 3 4 1 0 1  4  63 37
1992  34  14  2  3 2 4 1 0 2  5  66 34
1993  29  14  1  2 2 4 1 0 2  4  61 39
1994  29  13  1  4 2 6 2 0 2  5  65 35
1995  30  10  1  4 2 6 2 0 1  5  61 39
1996  33  10  1  4 3 5 1 0 1  5  62 38
1997  30  10  1  5 3 2 1 0 2  8  62 38
1998  36  3  1  9 2 2 2 0 1  9  67 33
1999  35  4  1  4 3 1 2 0 1  13  64 36
2000  33  4  1  6 2 2 2 0 2  11  63 37
2001  29  7  1  6 3 2 1 0 2  9  61 39
2002  27  5  0  8 3 3 1 0 2  8  58 42
2003  23  4  0  7 3 4 1 0 2  8  54 46
2004  36  6  1  n.a. 4 5 1 0 n.a.  n.a.  54 46
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 